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 Summary   
 
In this paper, a macroeconomic model with financial frictions was estimated with a view to 
evaluate the interactions between the Moroccan banking system and the evolutions of the 
macroeconomic framework. Indeed, two heterogeneous commercial banks were introduced into an 
objective to highlight the frictions and financial shocks which affect the evolutions of the 
macroeconomic economic conditions. The results obtained made it possible to confirm that this 
model reproduced, to a certain extent, the various fundamental characteristics of the Moroccan 
economic system. In addition, some shocks were planned in order to measure their impacts on the 
equilibrium of the system. The results were convincing and the introduction of the banking system 
into this model proved to be persuasive. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The economic and empirical literature treating macroeconomic models with microeconomic 
foundation neglected, during a certain time, the existence of frictions in the activity of financing 
and financial intermediation. In the traditional models of monetary policy, the financial 
intermediation was often ensured by the means of the central bank or through the emissions of the 
obligations of companies whose the owners are the households. Moreover, the majority of these 
models do not take into account the banking system, and when it is taken into consideration, these 
models omit the existence of an interbank market and informational imperfections resulting from 
the market of the credit. 
Several assumptions were adopted during the implementation of these models, namely the 
perfect rationality of the agents, efficiency of the various markets and the neutrality of finance vis-
à-vis the real economy. These assumptions have created a wide gap between the results of different 
theoretical models and the economic and financial reality. 
It is only after the advent of the international financial crisis of 2008, which confirmed the 
interconnection between the financial sphere and the persistence of the business cycle, that 
empirical and theoretical work started to question the utility to actively integrate the financial 
intermediation in the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models (DSGE). In the same way, 
the costs which were assumed by the various agents (households and firms), accelerated the process 
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of realization of this type of models which integrate frictions and financial shocks generated by the 
existence of a system of financial intermediation. In addition, the taking into account of the 
financial stability function by the central banks aroused the interest to integrate the macroeconomic 
models with banking system in the analytical device making it possible to reinforce the macro 
prudential regulation and to provide models able to produce inputs for different stress test exercises. 
Actually, several recent works concentrated on the problems of integrating the financial 
system in the macroeconomic models. The objective is to highlight the importance of the various 
frictions and financial shocks that may endanger the real economy. The introduction of the financial 
system, and in particular the banking system, will make it possible to describe at the same time the 
cyclic behaviors of the economy and to give microeconomic explanations to the evolutions of some 
financial sizes ignored until now. Indeed, the taking into account of the banking system will make 
it possible to understand the interactions between the deposits, the loans, the banks’ profits, the 
effects of contagion and the impacts of the evolutions of the default rates and other financial 
variables on macro-economic and monetary stability. This will allow, among other things, to 
highlight the situation of the banking system in terms of financial stability. For this purpose, the 
establishment of a macroeconomic model incorporating financial system will help to measure the 
effects of inside and outside shocks that may constrain the activity of the optimal allocation of the 
financial system and its ability to maintain its resilience to extreme situations.  
The introduction of the macroeconomic models with financial frictions does not call into 
question the utility of the other tools intended to evaluate financial stability (FSI1, models of macro 
stress test and early warning systems). However, the existence of great models integrating the 
financial system, makes it possible to answer the global objectives of a model of financial stability. 
Although the reduced models (panel data, time series, structural models) make it possible to 
quantify the responses of the financial system to the shocks affecting some factors of vulnerability 
(credit risk, liquidity risk and others), they remain less effective for analyzing more general 
questions. The introduction of an evaluation system, using a macroeconomic model incorporating 
the financial system, will make it possible to have a more complete view by introducing the 
majority of the shocks affecting the financial system and in addition to quantify their impact on the 
real economy. The pioneering work of English theorists have confirmed that the DSGE models are 
best suited to respond effectively to this type of requirement (see Goodhart et al. (2006)). 
The macroeconomic modeling exercise integrating the banking system is very recent. Works 
relating to the question remain limited and meet sometimes heterogeneous aims. Model BGG of 
Bernanke and Al (1999) made it possible to include the procyclical behavior of the loans via 
frictions related to the existence of a financial accelerator. This model continues to show its success, 
by reproducing the evolutions of the business cycle. However, there remains imperfect in the 
direction where it considers only one function for the banking system which is the granting of the 
credits. Aspects as the default and the existence of the interbank market were unfortunately 
                                                            
1 Financials soundness indicators (IMF (2006)) 
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neglected. Agustin and Al (2010) were based on work of Goodhart et al. (2006) to elaborate a 
model DSGE for Colombia. Their work made it possible to obtain a model with acceptable quality 
of prediction in the short run. Their model envisages the existence of three banks on the interbank 
market, the households, companies and also the central bank as a monetary authority and banking 
supervisory. Dib (2010) succeeded to develop a model DSGE on the basis of BGG model which 
include at the same time, the financial accelerator and the financial frictions on the interbank 
market, through the existence of an informational asymmetry between the borrowers and the 
lenders. The work of Walque and Al (2010) for the bank of Luxemburg made it possible to produce 
a DSGE with two commercial banks and a banking supervision authority distinct from the central 
bank. Their work included, moreover, specificities of Basle II and permit to have answers in term 
of capital requirement and in term of injection of liquidity in financial crisis situations. Goodhart 
and al (2010) succeded to elaborate a DSGE model with two commercial banks and some financial 
frictions which are the default rates and the liquidity injections. Other works, treating these question 
gave satisfying results permitting to confirm the utility to include a banking system in 
macroeconomic models, for example the works of Goodfriend and Al (2007), Gertler and Al (2009) 
and Christiano and Al (2009). 
DSGE models incorporating the banking system, put in production during these two last 
years, tried to confirm their relevance in term of economic and financial analysis. The results 
obtained remain contrasted, but the fact of integrating the financial system gave more rigor to the 
economic dynamic. Moreover, factors such as the default rates, regulatory capital and the solvency 
rations can henceforth be handled and be the subject of several tests of macro stress testing. 
In this paper, we will try to develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model 
adapted to the Moroccan economy including the banking system. This work is mainly inspired 
from the work of Goodhart et al. (2006 and 2010). The model we propose aims to measure the 
financial stability of the Moroccan banking system through its integration into a macroeconomic 
model. Two types of heterogeneous representative banks were indeed introduced, with the 
possibility of a deal on the interbank market. In addition, we consider including the frictions related 
to the credit market through the existence of different default rates. 
However, before beginning the presentation of the microeconomic foundations of the model, 
we intend to briefly present the current context of the Moroccan economy to emphasize the utility 
of this type of model for the Moroccan economy. 
The decision to maintain a fixed exchange rate regime, with a partial closure of the capital 
account, allowed the country to remain immune from the first negative fluctuations of international 
financial markets. However, and through the real economy, the economic crisis experienced by the 
developed countries has affected the evolution of several macroeconomic aggregates in close 
relationship with changes in foreign economies (European). Indeed, the foreign demand in 
Morocco, the remittances from Moroccans living abroad and the tourism revenues shrank, reducing 
the non-agricultural added value and the net foreign assets of the country. The regression of the 
Moroccan economic activity quickly spread to the banks activity, combined with lower growth 
rates of credit to the economy and of customer deposits. Therefore, the needs for increased liquidity 
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and injections made by the Central Bank have increased, reflecting the birth of a period of lack of 
liquidity in the banking system. Moreover, and beyond the negative effects of the financial crisis, 
these period highlighted the interconnection between the banking activity and the evolution of the 
macroeconomic framework of the country. The Moroccan banking remains in fact dominated by 
the traditional activities of transformation of maturities, and the majority of bank assets consist of 
loans to the economy. This dominance of the intermediation activity makes the balance sheet of 
the Moroccan banking system increasingly exposed to the fluctuations of the habits of economic 
agents in terms of savings and investments as well as to the changes in the added value of the 
country. In addition, the importance of short-term deposits as liabilities of the various banks, 
continuously expose them to a risk of deformation of the economic conditions of households and 
firms in terms of consumption, savings and investment. A simple change in consumer preferences 
of economic agents may limit the strength of bank balance sheets and especially when the sources 
of financing emanating from the financial market are limited. This structure of the Moroccan 
banking system allows confirming that the conception of a macroeconomic model with banking 
system can reproduce the different existing microeconomic relationships. 
2. Model 
 
In order to evaluate the interactions between the real economy and the Moroccan banking 
system, a stochastic dynamic model of general stability integrating the banking system is elaborate. 
This model includes five actors, namely: households, firms of production, the central bank and two 
trade banks heterogeneous. The first bank has the role the collection of the deposits near the 
households and second is intended to satisfy the needs for liquidity of the companies and this 
through the granting of the appropriations and the financing of the requirements in working capital. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Financial flows between the economic agents 
 
The representative household is considered to be the owner of both banks and his savings 
generate a rate of return which allows to increase his future consumption. His second source of 
income is the salary from his activity within the productive system. The business sector is 
considered to be monopolistic with manufacturing production. The outputs of the representative 
Interbank loan 
Interbank loan 
Deposit 
Expending goods 
Wages 
Representative household 𝒎𝒎 Representative firm 𝒇𝒇 
Deposit bank 𝜹𝜹 Investment bank 𝜸𝜸 
Central Bank   
Loan to firm 
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firm of the production system are intended to meet their needs and those of households. To achieve 
its production purposes, the firm uses capital originating from the investment bank in return for a 
remuneration rate. 
The relationship between the two banks of the system is realized through the existence of an 
interbank market. The bank noted 𝛿𝛿 uses the funds of depositors (households) to grant credits to 
the bank noted 𝛾𝛾 which ensures intermediation with the productive sector. The bank 𝛾𝛾 also receives 
credits from the central bank and provides loans to the productive sector. The profit of the two 
banks, respectively, for the bank 𝛿𝛿, the difference between the remuneration rate to the bank γ and 
the interest rate on deposits and, for the bank γ, is the difference between the interest rate on the 
producing sector and the interest rate earned by the bank 𝛿𝛿  and the central bank. The competition 
between the two banks has been neglected which leaves prevailing a monopolistic structure in the 
supply and demand market. The interbank market is considered complete in the sense that 
transactions between the two banks are continuous and uninterrupted. 
The central bank intervenes in this structure of the economy through its ability to inject 
money into the money market. He was admitted in the model that the central bank intervenes 
through open market operations. In this context, it can increase its intervention to satisfy a massive 
need for liquidity and to meet the additional demand in the money market. In this perspective, the 
model neglects the existence of a Taylor rule and the central bank claims just his role of liquidity 
provider. 
The five economic agents of the model are regarded as being rational agents, able to 
maximize their expected intertemporal utility at the date 𝑡𝑡 = 0 by taking into account all the 
constraints involved. We will be interested by the set of discrete times 𝑇𝑇 = {0,⋯ , 𝑡𝑡 − 1, 𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡 +1,⋯ }. In this paragraph, we briefly present the various problems of optimization in order to lead 
to the equilibrium conditions which will make it possible to obtain the optimal solution of the 
model. In the appendices, we give the necessary conditions of first order thus obtained and the 
various steps of optimization. 
 
2.1. Representative household m 
 
In the exercise of modeling, we chose to represent the whole of the households by a 
representative household 𝑚𝑚 which maximizes its expected intertemporal utility at the date 𝑡𝑡 = 0: max
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 , 𝐿𝐿𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡, 𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡: ∀𝑡𝑡∈𝑇𝑇 𝐸𝐸0 �∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡 �𝑈𝑈 �𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 � + λ𝑈𝑈(𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚 − 𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡)�∞𝑡𝑡=0 �  (1) 
under the constraint: 
𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 +  𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 + 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡∙𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 + 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡−1(1 + 𝑟𝑟𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 + 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 ,    ∀𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑇 (2) 
 
(i.e expenditure in goods + deposits = monetary endowment for 𝑚𝑚 + labour income + refunding received on the deposits 
+ profits on the two banks) 
 
with: 
𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡: Monetary endowment for the representative household 𝑚𝑚 at the date T 
𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡: Amount of money allocated by 𝑚𝑚 for the purchase of the consumer goods at the date T 
𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡: Deposits of 𝑚𝑚 in the deposit bank 𝛿𝛿 at the date T 
𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡: Price of the consumer goods at the date T 
𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚: Available time of 𝑚𝑚 
𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡: Time devoted by 𝑚𝑚 to work at the period T 
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𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡: Wage rate per unit of time worked in period t 
𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡: Expected refunding rate of the deposit bank 𝛿𝛿 with 𝑚𝑚 during the time 𝑡𝑡 − 1 
𝑟𝑟𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡:  Expected repayment rate of deposit bank 𝛿𝛿  to m in period t-1 
𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 : Profit of the deposit bank 𝛿𝛿 at the period T 
𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡: Profit of the investment bank 𝛾𝛾 at the period T 
𝛽𝛽: Actualization factor 
𝜆𝜆: Leisure relative preference parameter 
 
The representative household income consists of wages, interest earned on deposits, 
dividends obtained from the two banks and the money at its disposal. These revenues are either 
consumed or saved in the bank deposits.. 
 
2.2. Productive sector represented by the firm 𝒇𝒇 
 
We will represent the whole of the manufacturing production companies by a representative 
firm noted 𝑓𝑓 which maximizes its expected intertemporal utility at the date 𝑡𝑡 = 0 : max 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡, 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 , 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡, 𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡: ∀𝑡𝑡∈𝑇𝑇 𝐸𝐸0�∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡�𝑈𝑈(𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 −  𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡)�∞𝑡𝑡=0 � (3) 
 
under the constraints:   𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 ∙  𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡−1 =  𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 + 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡−1 ∙ 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡−1,    ∀𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑇 (4) 
(i.e. Credits reimbursement of 𝑓𝑓 = Monetary endowment for 𝑓𝑓 + Income from sales of 𝑓𝑓 at the previous period)  𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 =  𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡1+ 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 − ∆𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡(1−  𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡  ) 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡−1,    ∀𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑇 (5) 
(i.e. Expenditure of 𝑓𝑓 devoted to wages= Credits of 𝑓𝑓– Credits costs of the previous period) 
 
The function of production is modeled by; 
𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 � 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡 �𝛼𝛼 ,    ∀𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑇 (6) 
with: 
𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡: Production of consumer goods by the representative firm 𝑓𝑓 at the period 𝑡𝑡  𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡: Quantity of good offered by 𝑓𝑓 to the sale at the period 𝑡𝑡  𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡: Debt of 𝑓𝑓 at the period 𝑡𝑡  𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡: Repayment rate on debt of 𝑓𝑓 at the investment bank 𝛾𝛾 at the period 𝑡𝑡  𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡: Interest rate on loans granted by the investment bank 𝛾𝛾 to 𝑓𝑓 at the period 𝑡𝑡  𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡: Amount of money allocated by 𝑓𝑓 to labor at the date 𝑡𝑡  𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡: Technological factor at the period 𝑡𝑡 
𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡: Wage rate per unit of time worked in the period 𝑡𝑡  𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡: Monetary endowment for 𝑓𝑓 at the period 𝑡𝑡  ∆𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡: Penalty of default of 𝑓𝑓 on its debt at the period 𝑡𝑡 
𝛼𝛼: Returns to scale parameter 
 
The representative firm maximizes its expected intertemporal profit expected under two types 
of constraints. The first relates to the repayment obligations of the bank debt and the second relates 
to the remuneration of different inputs which contribute to the formation of added value. 
The modifications of the equilibrium conditions are supposed to intervene following a 
fluctuation in the technological factor of the firm. To simulate the shocks on the technological 
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factor of the firm, we suppose that this factor 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 follows an autoregressive process of order 1: 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡) = 𝜌𝜌𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(?̅?𝐴) + (1 − 𝜌𝜌𝐴𝐴)𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝜀𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡 (7) 
Where ?̅?𝐴 is the value of 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 in equilibrium and �𝜀𝜀𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡� is a Gaussian white noise, i.e:  
𝜀𝜀𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡 ↝ 𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴2) (8) 
 
Another type of shock can occur threatening the activity of the firm, it is the one related to 
credit risk when the firm is facing solvency problems towards the investment bank γ. To model 
this shock, we assume that the default penalty To model this shock, we suppose that the penalty of 
default  ∆𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 follows an autoregressive process of order 1: 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙( ∆𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 ) = 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙�∆𝑓𝑓����� + �1 − 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(∆𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝜀𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 (9) 
Where ∆𝑓𝑓���� is the value of ∆𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 in the equilibrium and �𝜀𝜀𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡� is a Gaussian white noise, i.e:  
𝜀𝜀𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 ↝ 𝑁𝑁�0,𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙2� (10) 
 
 
2.3. Deposit bank 𝜹𝜹 
 
The first type of bank considered in this model is a deposit bank, whose the heart of its 
business is the collection of savings from households. However, and in order to fructify funds it is 
associated, in the interbank market, with the second bank to finance investment and contribute to 
economic growth. In this perspective, it maximizes the expected intertemporal utility at the 
following  𝑡𝑡 = 0  date: max 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡, 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡, 𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡: ∀𝑡𝑡∈𝑇𝑇 𝐸𝐸0�∑ ?̂?𝛽𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝑈𝑈( 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡)∞𝑡𝑡=0 � (11) 
 
under the constraint:   𝑑𝑑𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 = 𝑚𝑚𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 +  𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡1+𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 − ∆𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡  (1 −  𝑎𝑎𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡) 𝑝𝑝𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡−1        ∀𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑇  (12) 
(i.e. interbank loan of the deposit bank 𝛿𝛿 towards the investment bank 𝛾𝛾 = Monetary endowment of the bank 𝛿𝛿 + 
Deposit of the households in the bank 𝛿𝛿 − Cost on the credit of 𝛿𝛿 towards the households) 
 
with the profit of the deposit bank 𝛿𝛿 defined by:  𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡= 𝑅𝑅𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡(1 +  𝑟𝑟𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡−1) 𝑑𝑑𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡−1 −  𝑎𝑎𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 ∙  𝑝𝑝𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡−1, ∀𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑇 (13) 
 
The variables and the parameters are defined by: 
𝑚𝑚𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡: Monetary endowment of the bank of deposit 𝛿𝛿 at the beginning of the period  𝑡𝑡  𝑝𝑝𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡: Debt of the bank of deposit 𝛿𝛿 vis-à-vis the representative household 𝑚𝑚  𝑅𝑅𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡: Expected refunding rate of the investment bank 𝛾𝛾 towards the deposit bank 𝛿𝛿     
         during the period 𝑡𝑡 − 1  𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡: Interbank interest rate during the time 𝑡𝑡  𝑑𝑑𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡: Deposits of the deposit bank 𝛿𝛿 in the investment bank 𝛾𝛾 at the period 𝑡𝑡 
𝑟𝑟𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡: Remuneration rate of the deposits of 𝑚𝑚 at the deposit bank 𝛿𝛿 at the period 𝑡𝑡  𝑎𝑎𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡: Repayment rate of the debt of the deposit bank 𝛿𝛿 towards the representative household   
        𝑚𝑚 at the date 𝑡𝑡 
∆𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 : Penalty of default of the deposit bank 𝛿𝛿 on its debt towards the representative household   
        𝑚𝑚 at the period 𝑡𝑡 
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𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 : Profit of the deposit bank 𝛿𝛿 at the period 𝑡𝑡 
?̂?𝛽: Actualization factor of the banks 
 
The profit of the deposit bank depends on the evolution of the interbank interest rate and the 
conditions of saving of the representative household. The evolution of the deposits of the 
representative household at the deposit bank is conditioned by the fluctuations of the refunding rate 
of the deposit bank towards the representative household, influencing thus the penalty of default. 
In order to emphasize the effects of a contraction of the deposits, we suppose that the penalty of 
default ∆𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 follows an autoregressive process of order 1: 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(∆𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡) = 𝜌𝜌𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙�∆𝛿𝛿����� + (1 − 𝜌𝜌𝑐𝑐)𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(∆𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝜀𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡  (14) 
Where ∆𝛿𝛿���� is the value of ∆𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 in equilibrium and �𝜀𝜀∆𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡� is a Gaussian white noise, i.e:  
𝜀𝜀𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 ↝ 𝑁𝑁�0,𝜎𝜎𝑐𝑐2�  (15) 
 
 
2.4. Investment Bank  𝜸𝜸  
 
The second type of bank considered in this model is an investment bank noted 𝛾𝛾. While 
profiting from the resources emanating from the deposit bank, the investment bank 𝛾𝛾 contributes 
directly to the economic growth via the financing the productive firm. In this respect, the bank 𝛾𝛾 
maximizes its expected intertemporal utility at the date 𝑡𝑡 = 0 : max 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡, 𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡, 𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡: ∀𝑡𝑡∈𝑇𝑇 𝐸𝐸0�∑ ?̂?𝛽𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝑈𝑈( 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡)∞𝑡𝑡=0 �  (16) 
under the constraint:   𝑑𝑑𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 =  𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 +  𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡1+ 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 −  ∆𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡(1 −  𝑎𝑎𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡) 𝑝𝑝𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡−1          ∀𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑇  (17) 
(i.e. Loans of the bank 𝛾𝛾 granted the firm 𝑓𝑓 = Monetary endowment of 𝛾𝛾 + Loans of 𝛾𝛾 in the interbank market − 
Interbank credit cost of 𝛾𝛾) 
 
with :  𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 =  𝑅𝑅𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡(1 +  𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡−1) 𝑑𝑑𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡−1 −  𝑎𝑎𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 ∙  𝑝𝑝𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡−1                ∀𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑇  (18) 
 
The variables and the parameters are defined by:  𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡: Monetary endowment of the investment bank 𝛾𝛾 at the beginning of the period  𝑡𝑡  𝑝𝑝𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡: Debt of the investment bank 𝛾𝛾 in the interbank market during the period  𝑡𝑡  𝑅𝑅𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡: Refunding rate of the representative firm 𝑓𝑓 hoped by the commercial bank 𝛾𝛾     
         during the time 𝑡𝑡 − 1  𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡: Interest rate of the credit granted by the investment bank 𝛾𝛾 to 𝑓𝑓 during the period   𝑡𝑡  𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡: Interbank interest rate during the period  𝑡𝑡  𝑑𝑑𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡: Deposits  of the investment bank 𝛾𝛾 at the representative firm 𝑓𝑓 in period   𝑎𝑎𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡: Depreciation rate of the debt of the investment bank 𝛾𝛾 in the interbank market   
        during the period  𝑡𝑡  ∆𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡: Penalty of default of the investment bank 𝛾𝛾 on its debt in the interbank market   
        during the period  𝑡𝑡 
𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡: Profit of the investment bank 𝛾𝛾 at the period 𝑡𝑡 
 
9 
 
We suppose that the penalty of default  ∆𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 of the investment bank in the interbank market 
follows an autoregressive process of order 1: 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(∆𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡) = 𝜌𝜌𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(∆𝛾𝛾����) + �1 − 𝜌𝜌𝑑𝑑�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(∆𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝜀𝑑𝑑,𝑡𝑡  (19) 
Where ∆𝛿𝛿���� is the value of ∆𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 in equilibrium and �𝜀𝜀𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡� is a Gaussian white noise, i.e:  
𝜀𝜀𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 ↝ 𝑁𝑁�0,𝜎𝜎𝑐𝑐2�  (20) 
 
2.5 Fiscal policy and outside money 
 
We define the outside money as an injection of liquidity in the economy either by the 
government or by foreign transfers. The outside money enters the system free and clear of any 
obligation and accumulates in the economy.  
If 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 is the outside money entering the economy at the period 𝑡𝑡, i.e. entering the system in 
the form of aggregate monetary endowment, then we choose to model the shock of the outside 
money by a perturbation of his growth rate which is defined by: 
𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 = 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡−1  (21) 
The aggregate monetary endowment is distributed across all the economic agents: 
𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 + 𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 + 𝑚𝑚𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 + 𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡  (22) 
where 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 : monetary endowment for the representative household 
𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 : monetary endowment for the representative firm  
𝑚𝑚𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 : monetary endowment for the deposit bank 
𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 : monetary endowment for the investment bank 
We suppose that, in the model, the agents receive their endowment with the same 
proportions: 
 
�
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 = 𝜔𝜔1 ∙ 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡
𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 = 𝜔𝜔2 ∙ 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡
𝑚𝑚𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 = 𝜔𝜔3 ∙ 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡
𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 = 𝜔𝜔4 ∙ 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡   (23) 
Where the weights respect: 
𝜔𝜔1 + 𝜔𝜔2 + 𝜔𝜔3 + 𝜔𝜔4 = 1  (24) 
In order to stationnarize the variable 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 which is in constant growth, we will divide in the 
model all the monetary variables by 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡−1 . So, if 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 is a monetary variable we will replace it by: 
𝑋𝑋�𝑡𝑡 = 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡−1  (25) 
To simulate the fiscal shock we suppose that the growth rate 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 follows an autoregressive 
process of order 1: 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡) = 𝜌𝜌𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(?̅?𝑔) + �1 − 𝜌𝜌𝑔𝑔�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝜀𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑡  (26) 
Where ?̅?𝑔 is the value of 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 in equilibrium and �𝜀𝜀𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑡� is a Gaussian white noise, i.e:  
𝜀𝜀𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑡 ↝ 𝑁𝑁�0,𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔2�  (27) 
 
The fiscal shock leads to an increase of money available to economic agents, causing 
mutations in the behavior of savings, of consumption and of production. These agents will have 
their ability to meet their various commitments improved following the abundant liquidity in their 
10 
 
portfolios. Companies in finding that the money is fairly present among the households will be 
encouraged to reduce their quantities of production to fight against a likely decline in prices. This 
behavior of firms will reduce the output and the added value created and the level of wages and 
employment. Facing this situation, households will respond by reducing the allocation for savings 
and deposits with the aim to smooth their consumption and to stabilize their baskets of consumer 
goods. Banks on their part will be encouraged to reduce the amount of funds allocated to the 
economy and promote a policy of credit rationing. The decline in deposits and then in loans will 
have the effect to increase the interest rates in the deposit and credit market as well as in the 
interbank market. This will result in the decline of the asset prices and in the triggering of a process 
of deleveraging and deflation which will not be beneficial for economic agents, in a situation of 
credit rationing. 
 
2.6. Monetary policy and inside money 
 
The inside money represents the interventions of the Central bank on the interbank market. 
The liquidities injected leave the system when the banks of investment repay their obligations. We 
model the shocks of the inside money by the changes on the level of the open market operations. 
𝑀𝑀�𝑡𝑡 = 𝜉𝜉𝑀𝑀,𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀�𝑡𝑡  (28) 
where   
𝑀𝑀�𝑡𝑡 = 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡−1    and 𝑀𝑀�𝑡𝑡 = 𝑀𝑀�𝑡𝑡𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡−1  (29) 
𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 being the inside money and 𝑀𝑀�𝑡𝑡 the inside money in the equilibrium state. 
The parameter 𝜉𝜉𝑀𝑀,𝑡𝑡 is supposed to follow an autoregressive process of order 1: 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙�𝜉𝜉𝑀𝑀,𝑡𝑡� = 𝜌𝜌𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙�𝜉𝜉?̅?𝑀� + (1 − 𝜌𝜌𝑀𝑀)𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙�𝜉𝜉𝑀𝑀,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝜀𝜀𝑀𝑀,𝑡𝑡 (30) 
Where �𝜀𝜀𝑀𝑀,𝑡𝑡� is a Gaussian white noise, i.e: 
𝜀𝜀𝑀𝑀,𝑡𝑡 ↝ 𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝑀𝑀2 )  (31) 
 
3. Calibration of the model 
 
Based on the Moroccan economic and financial data, spanning from a period 2000 to 2010 
with quarterly frequency, we identified the parameters and initial values that will be used for 
simulation purposes. The data are taken from the official sites of various Moroccan institutions 
responsible for the publication of public data relating to financial and economic conditions of 
Morocco.  
Initially, the choice of initial values of the model was carried out according to two options: 
the first is based on the average of the macroeconomic series for which available data are deep 
enough, while the second is based on the taking into consideration of a base-year, our choice was 
established on the base-year of 2009.  
The endogenous variables which were initialized through the average of their evolutions 
during the years 2000 and 2010 are the credit to economy, the deposits of customers, the inflation 
rate, the GDP, the money and interbank interest rate. 
Variables Averages 
Interbank interest rate 3.366% 
Growth rate of m3 1.027 
Inflation rate 2.2% 
Deposits of the customers (log) 5.560 
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Loan of the customers (log) 5.4578 
GDP (log) 5.095 
Table 1: Inside variables initialized by their average 
 
According to the evolutions recorded during the year 2009, the interbank debt, the bank’s 
profitability, the proportion to be consumed, the interest rates presented the following values: 
 
Variables Value in 2009 
Interbank loan (log) 7.78 
Banking profitability  0.14 
Proportion to be consumed 0.58 
Deposit interest rate 0.06 
Credit interest rate 0.03 
Quantity of goods offered by 𝑓𝑓 (𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓) 0.38 
Monetary endowment for 𝑓𝑓 (𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓) 2 
Table 2: Inside variables initialized by their value in 2009 
In the second time, the calibration of the model was elaborates by an analysis of the evolution 
of the macroeconomic aggregates of the country. This stage of work initially consisted in 
determining the evolutions of elasticities of some equations of the model, then in taking into 
account the various elasticities used in the empirical work applied to other countries. The discount 
coefficients for the households and the banks were evaluated hypothetically to the unit. The various 
repayments rates of the bilateral debts are considered close to 1, we consider thus that there does 
not exist any phenomenon of insolvency on behalf of the various economic agents in equilibrium 
situation. The technological factor was approximated according to the theory by a value equal to 
the unit. Concerning the rates of profit of the companies, it was allowed that these rates are in the 
neighborhood of 20% which is equivalent to an internal rate of return higher than the cost of the 
capital on the Moroccan financial market. The other parameters that track the inertia in the system 
were evaluated by using time series models. The table below shows the different values thus 
selected 2. 
 
Parameter Value Parameter Value 
𝛼𝛼 1 ?̅?𝑔 1.008 
𝛽𝛽 1 ?̅?𝐴 1 
∆𝑓𝑓 0.94 𝜌𝜌𝑔𝑔 0.96 
∆𝛿𝛿 0.97 𝜌𝜌𝐴𝐴 0.8 
∆𝛾𝛾 0.99 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙 0.8 
𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚 1 𝜌𝜌𝑐𝑐 0.8 
𝜔𝜔1 0.25 𝜌𝜌𝑑𝑑 0.8 
𝜔𝜔2 0.25   
𝜔𝜔3 0.25   
𝜌𝜌𝑀𝑀 0.7   
𝜉𝜉?̅?𝑀 0.5   
Table 3: Parameters initializing the model 
                                                            
2 The share of the money held initially all agents is leveling and is estimated at 25% of the total of the money in circulation. 
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3.1. Results of the calibrated model 
 
The elaboration of a macroeconomic model with financial frictions aims to reproduce the 
various interactions noted within the Moroccan economy. Moreover, the introduction of the 
banking system into this type of model will make it possible to refine the various economic results 
and will contribute to formulate more plausible economic interpretations. The relevance of the 
model is thus related to its capacity to generate the same behaviors of the macro-economic variables 
as those noted at the empirical level. From this point of view, we intend in this section to evaluate 
this model through, on the one hand, an analysis of the theoretical and empirical moments, and on 
the other hand via some statistics obtained after calibration. 
The analysis of the moments generated by the macroeconomic model makes it possible to 
validate its relevance. Its capacity to reproduce the various behaviors of the Moroccan economy is 
measured through the similarity between the empirical moments resulting from the available data 
and the theoretical moments which were produced by the model. The variables of interest which 
were analyzed are GDP, interbank interest rate, credit to economy, deposit interest rate, credit 
interest rate, money and deposits of the customers. The relative standard deviations calculated 
make it possible thus to corroborate the agreement between the empirical and theoretical series. 
Indeed, all the results were convincing and confirm that the model is able to reproduce the business 
cycles in Morocco as well as the interactions between the real sphere and the financial sphere. In 
this respect, it would be appropriate to use the model for simulation and also for testing the financial 
soundness of the banking system faced to different possible shocks. The results obtained are 
presented in the table below: 
 
Relative standard deviation 
Variables Theoretical moments Empirical moments 
Interbank credits 42% 26% 
GDP (𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓) 1% 2% 
Growth rate M3 (𝑔𝑔) 1% 2% 
Deposits of the households (𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚) 5% 2% 
Credit interest rates (𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓) 12% 22% 
Table 4: Theoretical and empirical relative standard deviation  
 
Concerning the analysis of the autocorrelations between the various endogenous variables, 
they made it possible to reproduce the inertia noted within the macroeconomic series. The table 
below summarizes the results: 
 
Simulated variables AR (1) 
Interbank rate 0.25 
Credit interest rates 0.22 
Deposits of the households 0.43 
Interbank loan 0.42 
Credit to firm 0.35 
GDP (log) 0.26 
Table 5: Autocorrelations of order 1 
  
These various results of the model confirm its robustness and its capacity to reproduce the 
various economic interactions. Through this model, calibrated to date, we have the ability to 
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imagine a number of shocks that may affect the Moroccan banking system and to evaluate the 
economic costs of failure of some economic agents. 
 
3.2. Simulations of the shocks  
 
The exercise of simulation consists in imagining various macroeconomic shocks and 
analyzing their impact on the various economic variables. During the elaboration of the theoretical 
model, we highlighted five shocks allowing to judge the relevance of the economic policies. 
Indeed, we highlighted a fiscal shock, a monetary shock, a technological shock and default shocks. 
The fiscal shock made it possible to increase the fraction of liquidity held by the various 
agents, which was combined by a reduction of the manufacturing output and consequently by a rise 
of the prices. Moreover, this situation led the households to reduce their deposits at the deposit 
banks to maintain their levels of consumption. This resulted in a fall of the loans intended for the 
firms as well as a significant rise of the credit interest rate. 
The productivity shock realized through a technological shock was reflected positively on 
the quantity of production of the firm, thus reducing the prices of the consumer goods and incenting 
the agents to consume even more. This improvement on the conditions of production will induce a 
fall in the quantity of work as well as in the wages paid by the company. Thus, the deposits of the 
customers will decrease with a regression of the profits of the deposit bank. While the investment 
bank will profit from the situation of the firm and their profits will increase. The improvement of 
the economic conditions, and especially those of the firm, and the increase of the demand of the 
households will lead to a significant decrease of interest rates. Thus, the interbank interest rate and 
the interest rate in the credit market will respond to this fall and will encourage the companies to 
have recourse more to the credit market. 
The monetary shock has a direct impact on the objective of the interest rate. Indeed, the 
injections of the central bank induced a fall of interest rates on the interbank market, which results 
by a fall of the profits’ deposit bank and conversely of those of the investment bank. This decline 
of the interbank rate will decrease the credit interest rates, which lets prevail an expansion in the 
granting of the credits becoming cheaper. Thus, the increase in the loans towards companies with 
a reduction of the cost of the capital will generate a fall in the general level of the prices which will 
stimulate the household consumption. 
Finally, the shock of defaults considered in the model resulted in a fall of the capacity of the 
firm to refund its engagements towards the investment bank. This involved a rise in the credit 
interest rates which resulted in increasing the income of the investment bank. Information about 
the quality of the companies will lead the households to reduce their savings following a decline 
of the wages and the time of work. This situation will worsen consequently to the fall of the 
household consumption and of the amount of money allocated to savings. Consequently, the 
general level of the prices will post an important fall, when we know that the firm continues to 
maintain its production intended to the sale. 
In order to show the relevance of the integration of the banking system in a DSGE model, 
we consider that it is useful to make the comparison between two types of models, the first taking 
account of the financial frictions and the second not taking account. The results which we obtained 
during various simulations made it possible to describe the behaviors of the economic agents with 
respect to particular economic situations. The comparison between the results obtained by the two 
models confirms the robustness of the model integrating the financial frictions. 
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4. Estimation of the model by the Bayesian method 
 
4.1. Estimation method 
 
The estimation of the DSGE model with financial frictions will help to validate the calibrated 
version already elaborated and whose the results were conclusive. The usual estimation techniques 
used and often rely on statistical inference remain unsuitable for this type of modeling, hence the 
use of Bayesian technique (Fernández-Villaverde (2009)). 
The latter is commonly used in order to estimate the DSGE models for reasons of 
convenience and effectiveness. More precisely, the recourse to this econometric technique is 
justified by the existence of several local minimum and maximum in the stochastic dynamic models 
and especially those incorporating the imperfections of the markets (nominal and real rigidities and 
financial frictions) as well as the flat likelihoods in the majority of the parameters. These 
incompleteness is due primarily to the scarcity of the data and the flexibility of the DSGE models 
which can generate a similar behavior with different relatively combinations from the values of the 
parameters. 
The environment of DSGE models is characterized by restricted data, which generate 
difficulties as to the use of real information. Indeed, the recourse to the maximum of likelihood 
requires complete information on the parameters in order to have effective and convincing 
estimates. Because of the scarcity of the data, only the Bayesian technique guaranteed a better 
approximation of the reality. 
The Bayesian technique indeed uses the idea of the theorem of Bayes where it is enough to 
carry out a judgment on the distributions of the parameters and to confront them directly with the 
real or simulated data. Indeed, this technique is an optimal rule in information processing as 
indicated by Zellner (1988), it uses all available information on the data from a sample large or 
small, and whose reliability is proved. 
The relation of Bayes admits that the knowledge of some information available contributes 
to increase information produced a posteriori. Precisely, the Bayes' formula applies to the prior 
density parameters and returns the posterior density of parameters conditional on the 
observations.The formula of Bayes applied to densities of probability is written: 
𝜋𝜋(𝜃𝜃 𝑦𝑦⁄ ) = 𝑓𝑓(𝑦𝑦/𝜃𝜃) × 𝜋𝜋(𝜃𝜃)
𝑚𝑚(𝑦𝑦)                        (32) 
 where 
𝜋𝜋(𝜃𝜃) :  marginal density a priori of 𝜃𝜃 
𝑓𝑓(𝑦𝑦/𝜃𝜃): likelihood of the data 𝑦𝑦 
𝜋𝜋(𝜃𝜃 𝑦𝑦⁄ ): density a posteriori of 𝜃𝜃 
𝑚𝑚(𝑦𝑦):marginal density of the data 𝑦𝑦 
 
The a posteriori distribution of the parameters is based on two a priori information available, 
that is the marginal distribution of 𝜃𝜃 as well as the information on 𝑦𝑦. This combination of 
information can generate more reliable estimates by minimizing the variance of the parameters 
determined a priori and a posteriori. Indeed, Gelman et al. (2004) argued that one might expect that 
the posterior variance of the parameters is smaller than the prior variance because it takes into 
account information on the parameters through the data. 
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Indeed, the two authors managed to affirm that the variance of the estimated parameters is of 
minimal variance: 
𝑉𝑉(𝜃𝜃) = 𝐸𝐸�𝑉𝑉(𝜃𝜃 𝑦𝑦⁄ )� + 𝑉𝑉�𝐸𝐸(𝜃𝜃 𝑦𝑦⁄ )�                    (33) 
This implies that the variance a posteriori 𝑉𝑉(𝜃𝜃 𝑦𝑦⁄ ) is on average smaller than the variance a 
priori 𝑉𝑉(𝜃𝜃). The difference 𝑉𝑉�𝐸𝐸(𝜃𝜃 𝑦𝑦⁄ )� depends on the variability of the average a posteriori of 
the distribution of the available data. Gelman deduced that more this variability is large more the a 
posteriori variability of 𝜃𝜃 is small. 
More generally, we don’t  refer to expectations, the posterior mean and posterior variance 
can be approximated as a compromise between a priori theory and data. The weights associated 
with these two sources of information depend respectively on the variability of the observed data 
and the variability of the a priori information. The larger the sample size increases more the relative 
weight of the prior decreases. So, the Bayesian approach provides greater efficiency on the 
estimation of the density of the estimated parameters, with the combined use of both available 
information (distribution and data). 
Thus through the Bayes relation we can obtain the estimates of the various parameters of 
interest. However, the use of the method requires methods of simulation of the a posteriori 
distribution. The methods of simulation which we chose to use are the Markov Chain Monte Carlo3 
(MCMC). 
 
4.2. Estimation results 
 
In the estimation phase of the model with financial frictions we used two types of estimations 
namely: the estimation of a small-scale model (NKM4) as well as the estimation by the recourse to 
the DSGE-VAR5.  
The estimated parameters of the various models were obtained using the available data on 
the Moroccan economy. The series used are quarterly frequency from 1985 to 2010. The use of the 
Bayesian method could reduce the problems of scarcity of the data for some series non available 
during the estimation of the DSGE model.  
The following table summarizes the results obtained after the estimation of the DSGE-VAR:   
 
Parameters DSGE-VAR  
 Value Distributions 
𝛽𝛽 0.89 Beta 
𝛼𝛼 0.9905 Normal 
𝜆𝜆 0.8902 Beta 
𝜌𝜌𝑀𝑀 0.9 Normal 
𝜌𝜌𝐴𝐴 0.7001 Normal 
𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙 0.7 Normal 
𝜌𝜌𝑐𝑐 0.6999 Normal 
𝜌𝜌𝑑𝑑 0.7003 Normal 
∆𝑓𝑓 0.7892 Beta 
∆𝛿𝛿 0.8014 Beta 
                                                            
3The methods known as MCMC rest on the construction of chains of Markov having the property to converge towards the distribution which one 
seeks to simulate. 
4New Keynesian Model 
5For more details to see Del Negro, Mr., and F. Schorfheide (2004). 
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∆𝛾𝛾 0.8116 Beta 
Table 6: Parameters estimated by the Bayesian method  
4.3. Comparison with the BVAR6 
 
In order to validate the estimates resulting from the DSGE model with financial frictions, we 
deduced from this last a small-scale model (NKM7) that can be compared with the BVAR model 
whose power was proven in the literature. 
 
 
 
Parameters BVAR  NKM  
 Value Distributions Value Distributions 
𝛽𝛽 1.06 Gamma 1.04 Gamma 
Persistence IS 1.16 Inv-gamma 1.01 Inv-gamma 
Persistence LM 0.78 Inv-gamma 0.69 Inv-gamma 
Philips curve  0.17 Normal 0.17 Normal 
Table 7: Parameters estimated by the two small-scale models 
 
The results obtained are almost identical, thus we can confirm that the introduction of the 
financial frictions into the DSGE model could contribute to improve the dynamics of the model. 
We also compared the predictive capacity of the three models. In this perspective, we can 
affirm that the estimates of the three models have a satisfactory predictive quality. The latter claims 
that the DSGE model with financial frictions largely traces the trends in Moroccan macroeconomic 
aggregates. Thus, we chose to compare the three models in terms of forecasting inflation.
                                                            
6Bayesian Vectorial Autoregressive (See Villemot (2007)). 
7After the log-linearization of the model 
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Figure 2: Inflation rate estimated by the three models 
 
4.3. Interpretation of shocks simulation  
 
The results obtained made it possible to affirm that the introduction of the financial frictions 
into the macroeconomic model improved the impulse responses as to the various economic 
policies. 
Indeed, we considered, in similarity with the responses produced by the calibrated model, to 
work out several shocks of economic policies to have an idea on the responses that estimated DSGE 
model with financial friction can produce. Thus, the three economic shocks are: a fiscal shock, a 
monetary shock and a technological shock. 
Fiscal shock:     
 
The reinforcement of the liquidity of the economic agents by the means of an increase in their 
consumption in time causes positive reactions compared to the behaviors of the responses of the 
agents. The shock thus added, gave responses in conformity with the economic theory. Thus, we 
see, in the horizon of six quarters, that the fiscal shock leads to an increase in bank profitability, in 
the price level, in the interbank rate and in the debt to finance growth. Concerning the economic 
growth, the effects of expansionary fiscal policy are positive but small. However, this policy which 
aims to strengthen the capacity of economic agents in terms of consumption, will cause the opposite 
effect with a lower rate of consumption which can be explained through the higher prices and 
interest rate markets (Ricardian equivalence). 
 
Monetary shock: 
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The responses obtained for a monetary shock which affects the various components of the 
real and financial sectors were in conformity with the economic theory. Thus, a rise of the central 
bank money positively affects the economic growth, the prices and the household consumption. By 
opposition, the cost of the debt of the firms, the outputs of the deposit banks and the interbank rate 
showed a fall in response of the rise of the central bank money. 
 
Technological shock: 
 
The impact of a shock on the productivity of the firms involves necessarily various effects 
on the Moroccan macroeconomic aggregates. Indeed, the responses obtained remain in conformity 
with economic perception. In the facts, rises of the efforts of productivity result in a fall of the 
prices, the debt, the interbank rate as well as the capacities of the households to make deposits at 
the finance firms. On the other hand, this economic policy involves a significant rise of the 
economic growth, the consumption and the profits of the commercial banks.  
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Figure 3: Technological shock 
 
Figure 4: Monetary shock 
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Figure 4: Fiscal shock 
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4.Conclusion 
 
The implementation of the DSGE model with financial frictions aims to achieve 
macroeconomic modeling incorporating the Moroccan banking system. This will allow us to 
measure the different interactions between the real and financial spheres and combine exercises 
incorporating the dynamic simulations and financial cycles that characterize the activity of 
intermediation. 
Based on the Moroccan data, one could obtain a calibrated model and found to describe the 
various changes in economic conditions. The integration of the banking system has quantified the 
economic costs of a shock to the various banks. In this preliminary version of the model, only a 
few shocks have been identified, namely those affecting the technology, liquidity, fiscal policy and 
the defaults of the firms. 
The comparison between the model with and without financial frictions showed us that the 
integration of the mechanisms of financial frictions has a positive effect on the responses of the 
model. The impulses generated through this model pertinently describe the rational behaviors of 
the various economic agents. In addition, the incorporation of the banking system in modeling 
contributes to describe the responses of the economic and financial variables as to various possible 
shocks, which can help to evaluate the financial stability of the Moroccan banking system. 
This model will be able to contribute, in addition, to generate plausible macroeconomic 
shocks in order to work out macro stress tests aiming to evaluate the robustness of the Moroccan 
banking system. In the same wake, the financial design of the model will make it possible to 
measure the articulation between some stabilization policies such as: monetary, fiscal and macro 
prudential policies. 
For now, this model does not include prudential variables, to judge the solvency of banking 
system, but in other works witch we will later realize we will take into consideration all these 
improvements. The incorporation of a prudential variable can be a reference for decisions 
concerning the financial stability. 
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Appendices 
 
I. Resolution of the first order conditions for DSGE model with financial frictions 
 
Problem of optimization of the representative household𝒎𝒎:   
 max
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 , 𝐿𝐿𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡, 𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡: ∀𝑡𝑡∈𝑇𝑇 𝐸𝐸0 � 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡 �𝑈𝑈 �𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 � + λ𝑈𝑈(𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚 − 𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡)�∞𝑡𝑡=0 �              (34) 
 under the constraint: 
𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 +  𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 + 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡∙𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 + 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡−1(1 + 𝑟𝑟𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 + 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 ,    ∀𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑇           (35) 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
The function of Lagrange is given by: 
𝐿𝐿 = 𝐸𝐸0 �∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡 �𝑈𝑈 �𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 � + λ𝑈𝑈(𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚 − 𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡) + 𝜸𝜸𝒕𝒕(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 + 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡∙𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 + 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡−1(1 +∞𝑡𝑡=0
𝑟𝑟𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 + 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 − 𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 −  𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡)��                             (36)  
 
First order conditions: 
 
1) 𝜕𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡
= 0 ⇔𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡�−𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡+1𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡+1𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡(1 + 𝑟𝑟𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡)� = 0 
⇔𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽.𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡{𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡+1𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡+1(1 + 𝑟𝑟𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡)} 
2) 𝜕𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡
= 0 ⇔𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡�−λ𝑈𝑈′(𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚 − 𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡) + 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡� = 0 
⇔𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 = λ𝑈𝑈′(𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚 − 𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡)𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡  
3) 𝜕𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡
= 0 ⇔𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡 � 1
𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡
𝑈𝑈′ �𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡
𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡
� − 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡� = 0 
⇔𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 = 1𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 𝑈𝑈′ �𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 � 
1st formula: 
λ
𝑈𝑈′(𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚 − 𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡)
𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡
= 1
𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡
𝑈𝑈′ �
𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡
𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡
� 
⇔
𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡
𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡
= λ𝑈𝑈′(𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚 − 𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡)
𝑈𝑈′ �
𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡
𝜃𝜃
𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡
�
 
 
⇔
𝜔𝜔�𝑡𝑡
?̂?𝑝𝑡𝑡
= λ𝑈𝑈′(𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚 − 𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡)
𝑈𝑈′ �
𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡
𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡
�
             (37) 
2nd formula: 1
𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡
𝑈𝑈′ �
𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡
𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡
� =  𝛽𝛽.𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 � 1𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡+1 𝑈𝑈′ �𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡+1𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡+1 �𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡+1(1 + 𝑟𝑟𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡)� 
We  set: 𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 = 𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡  
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Thus: 
⇔𝑈𝑈′(𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡) = 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 .𝛽𝛽.𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 � 1𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡+1 𝑈𝑈′(𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡+1)𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡+1(1 + 𝑟𝑟𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡)� 
⇔𝑈𝑈′(𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡) = ?̂?𝑝𝑡𝑡 .𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡−1.𝛽𝛽. (1 + 𝑟𝑟𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡).𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 � 1?̂?𝑝𝑡𝑡+1.𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 𝑈𝑈′(𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡+1)𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡+1� 
⇔
𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡
𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡−1
𝑈𝑈′(𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡) = 𝛽𝛽. (1 + 𝑟𝑟𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡).𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 �𝑈𝑈′(𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡+1)𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡+1?̂?𝑝𝑡𝑡+1
?̂?𝑝𝑡𝑡
� 
⇔𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡.𝑈𝑈′(𝑝𝑝) = 𝛽𝛽. (1 + 𝑟𝑟𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡).𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 �𝑈𝑈′(𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡+1)𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡+1?̂?𝑝𝑡𝑡+1
?̂?𝑝𝑡𝑡
�                  (38) 
Problem of optimization of the representative firm 𝒇𝒇: max 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡, 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 , 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡, 𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡: ∀𝑡𝑡∈𝑇𝑇 𝐸𝐸0 � 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡�𝑈𝑈(𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 −  𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡)�∞
𝑡𝑡=0
� 
under the budgetary constraints:  𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 ∙  𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡−1 =  𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 + 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡−1 ∙ 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡−1,    ∀𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑇  𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 =  𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡1 +  𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 − ∆𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡(1 −  𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡  ) 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡−1,    ∀𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑇 
and     
𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 � 𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡  𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡 �𝛼𝛼 ,    ∀𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑇 
The function of Lagrange: 
ℒ = 𝐸𝐸0 � 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡�𝑈𝑈(𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 −  𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡)�∞
𝑡𝑡=0
+ α𝑡𝑡� 𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 + 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡−1 ∙ 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡−1 −  𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 ∙  𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡−1�+ 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 �  𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡1 +  𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 − ∆𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡(1 −  𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡  ) 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡−1 −  𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡�� 
1) 𝜕𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝜕 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 = 0 ⇔𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡 �𝑈𝑈′(𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 −  𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡).𝛼𝛼. 𝑌𝑌𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 − 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡� = 0 
⇔𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼.𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 𝑈𝑈′(𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 −  𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡) 
2) 𝜕𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡
= 0 ⇔𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡(−𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 ∙ ∆𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡  ∙ 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡−1) = 0 
⇔𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 = 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 ∙ ∆𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 
3) 𝜕𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡
= 0 ⇔𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡�−𝑈𝑈′(𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 −  𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡)� + 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡+1𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 .𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡+1) = 0 
⇔𝑈𝑈′(𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 −  𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡)= 𝛽𝛽. 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 .𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡+1) 
4) 𝜕𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡
= 0 ⇔𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡 � 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
1+ 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡+1𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�−𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡+1 𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡+1 ∙ ∆𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡+1(1 −  𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡+1)� 
⇔
𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡1 +  𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡+1 ∙ ∆𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡+1) 
 
 
 
26 
 
1st formula: 
𝛼𝛼.𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 𝑈𝑈′(𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 −  𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡) = 𝛽𝛽(1 +  𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡)𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 �𝛼𝛼.𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡+1 𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡+1 ∙ ∆𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡+1.𝑈𝑈′(𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡+1 −  𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡+1)�  
⇔
𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 𝑈𝑈′(𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 −  𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡) = 𝛽𝛽(1 +  𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡)𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 �𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡+1 𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡+1 ∙ ∆𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡+1.𝑈𝑈′(𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡+1 −  𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡+1)� 
Where : 𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 � 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡 �𝛼𝛼 = 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡( 𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡)𝛼𝛼 
Thus: 
𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡( 𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡)𝛼𝛼 𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 𝑈𝑈′(𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 −  𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡) = 𝛽𝛽(1 +  𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡)𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 �𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1( 𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡+1)𝛼𝛼 𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡+1 ∙ ∆𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡+1.𝑈𝑈′(𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡+1 −  𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡+1)� 
⇔
𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡( 𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡)𝛼𝛼−1
𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡
𝑈𝑈′(𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 −  𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡) = 𝛽𝛽(1 +  𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡)𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 �𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1( 𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡+1)𝛼𝛼−1𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡+1 ∙ ∆𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡+1.𝑈𝑈′(𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡+1 −  𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡+1)� 
⇔𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡( 𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡)𝛼𝛼−1𝑈𝑈′(𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 −  𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡) = 𝛽𝛽(1 +  𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡)𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 �𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1( 𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡+1)𝛼𝛼−1𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡+1
𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡
∙ ∆𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡+1.𝑈𝑈′(𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡+1 −  𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡+1)� 
⇔𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡( 𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡)𝛼𝛼−1𝑈𝑈′(𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 −  𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡) = 𝛽𝛽(1 +  𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡)𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡
⎝
⎜
⎛𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1( 𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡+1)𝛼𝛼−1
𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝜔𝜔�𝑡𝑡+1
𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡−1𝜔𝜔�𝑡𝑡
∙ ∆𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡+1.𝑈𝑈′(𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡+1 −  𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡+1)
⎠
⎟
⎞
 
⇔𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 .𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡( 𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡)𝛼𝛼−1𝑈𝑈′(𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 −  𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡)
= 𝛽𝛽(1 +  𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡).𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡
⎝
⎜
⎛𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1( 𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡+1)𝛼𝛼−1
𝜔𝜔�𝑡𝑡+1
𝜔𝜔�𝑡𝑡
∙ ∆𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡+1.𝑈𝑈′(𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡+1 −  𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡+1)
⎠
⎟
⎞                  (39) 
2nd formula: 
𝑈𝑈′(𝑌𝑌𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡− 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡)
𝛽𝛽.𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 =𝛼𝛼.𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 𝑙𝑙𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑈𝑈′(𝑌𝑌𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡− 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡)𝛽𝛽.(1+ 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡)  
⇔
1+ 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡
𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡
 ==𝛼𝛼. 𝑌𝑌𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 ⇔ 1+ 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡  𝛼𝛼. �𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡� � 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡�𝛼𝛼 ⇔𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡(1+ 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡)𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡( 𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡)𝛼𝛼−1⇔𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡(1+ 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡)𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡( 𝐿𝐿𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡)𝛼𝛼 𝐿𝐿𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡  
⇔
𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡(1 +  𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡)
𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡
= 𝛼𝛼 𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡  
⇔
𝜔𝜔�𝑡𝑡
?̂?𝑝𝑡𝑡
(1 +  𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡) = 𝛼𝛼 𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡               (40) 
 
 
Problem of optimization of the bank 𝜹𝜹: max 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡, 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡, 𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡: ∀𝑡𝑡∈𝑇𝑇 𝐸𝐸0 � ?̂?𝛽𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝑈𝑈( 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡)∞
𝑡𝑡=0
� 
under constraint:  𝑑𝑑𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 = 𝑚𝑚𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 +  𝑝𝑝𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡1 + 𝑟𝑟𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡  − ∆𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡  (1 −  𝑎𝑎𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡) 𝑝𝑝𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡−1        ∀𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑇 
With  𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 = 𝑅𝑅𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡(1 +  𝑟𝑟𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡−1) 𝑑𝑑𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡−1 −  𝑎𝑎𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 ∙  𝑝𝑝𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡−1, ∀𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑇 
27 
 
 
 
 
 
The function of Lagrange: 
ℒ = 𝐸𝐸0 � ?̂?𝛽𝑡𝑡[ 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 + 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡( 𝑅𝑅𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 ∙ (1 +  𝑟𝑟𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡−1) ∙  𝑑𝑑𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡−1 −  𝑎𝑎𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 ∙  𝑝𝑝𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡−1 −  𝑑𝑑𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡)]∞
𝑡𝑡=0
� 
 
First order conditions: 
1) 𝜕𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝜕 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 = 0 ⇔ ?̂?𝛽𝑡𝑡(−𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡) + ?̂?𝛽𝑡𝑡+1𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡{𝑈𝑈′( 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡+1) 𝑅𝑅𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡+1(1 +  𝑟𝑟𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡)} = 0 
⇔𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡 = ?̂?𝛽. (1 +  𝑟𝑟𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡).𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡{𝑈𝑈′( 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡+1) 𝑅𝑅𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡+1} 
2) 𝜕𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝜕 𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 = 0 ⇔ ?̂?𝛽𝑡𝑡(−𝑈𝑈′( 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡) 𝑝𝑝𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡∆𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡−1 𝑝𝑝𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡−1) = 0 
⇔𝑈𝑈′( 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡) = 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡∆𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 
3) 𝜕𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝜕 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 = 0 ⇔ ?̂?𝛽𝑡𝑡 �𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡 � 11+ 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡�� + ?̂?𝛽𝑡𝑡+1𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡{−𝑈𝑈′( 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡+1) 𝑎𝑎𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡+1∆𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡+1(1 −  𝑎𝑎𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡+1)} 
⇔
𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡1 +  𝑟𝑟𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 = ?̂?𝛽.𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡{𝑈𝑈′( 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡+1) 𝑎𝑎𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡+1∆𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡+1∆𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡+1 𝑎𝑎𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡+1} 
⇔
𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡1 +  𝑟𝑟𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 = ?̂?𝛽.𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡{𝑈𝑈′( 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡+1) 𝑎𝑎𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡+1∆𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝑈𝑈′( 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡+1) 𝑎𝑎𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡+1} 
⇔
𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡1 +  𝑟𝑟𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 = ?̂?𝛽.𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡{𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡+1∆𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡+1} 
1st formula: 
𝑈𝑈′( 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡)
∆𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡
= ?̂?𝛽. (1 +  𝑟𝑟𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡).𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡{𝑈𝑈′( 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡+1) 𝑅𝑅𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡+1} 
⇔𝑈𝑈′( 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡) = ?̂?𝛽. (1 +  𝑟𝑟𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡).𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡{𝑈𝑈′( 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡+1) 𝑅𝑅𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡+1∆𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡}             (41) 
2nd formula: 
𝑈𝑈′( 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡)
∆𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡(1 +  𝑟𝑟𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡) = ?̂?𝛽.𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 �∆𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡+1 𝑈𝑈′( 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡+1)∆𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡+1 � 
⇔𝑈𝑈′( 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡) = ?̂?𝛽. (1 +  𝑟𝑟𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡).𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡{∆𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝑈𝑈′( 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡+1)}             (42) 
 
Problem of optimization of the bank 𝛾𝛾: max 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡, 𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡, 𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡: ∀𝑡𝑡∈𝑇𝑇 𝐸𝐸0 � ?̂?𝛽𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝑈𝑈( 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡)∞
𝑡𝑡=0
� 
Under the constraint:  𝑑𝑑𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 =  𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 +  𝑝𝑝𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡1 +  𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 −  ∆𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡(1 −  𝑎𝑎𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡) 𝑝𝑝𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡−1          ∀𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑇 
with     𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 =  𝑅𝑅𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡(1 +  𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡−1) 𝑑𝑑𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡−1 −  𝑎𝑎𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 ∙  𝑝𝑝𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡−1                ∀𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑇 
 
The function of Lagrange: 
ℒ = 𝐸𝐸0 � ?̂?𝛽𝑡𝑡 �𝑈𝑈( 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡) + 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡 � 𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 +  𝑝𝑝𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡1 +  𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 −  ∆𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡(1 −  𝑎𝑎𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡) 𝑝𝑝𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡−1 −  𝑑𝑑𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡��∞𝑡𝑡=0 � 
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First order conditions: 
1) 𝜕𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
= 0 ⇔ ?̂?𝛽𝑡𝑡(−𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡) + ?̂?𝛽𝑡𝑡+1𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡{𝑈𝑈′( 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡+1) 𝑅𝑅𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡+1(1 +  𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡)} = 0 
⇔𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡 = ?̂?𝛽. (1 +  𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡).𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡{𝑈𝑈′( 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡+1) 𝑅𝑅𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡+1} 
2) 𝜕𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
= 0 ⇔ ?̂?𝛽𝑡𝑡(−𝑈𝑈′( 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡) 𝑝𝑝𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡 ∆𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡  𝑝𝑝𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡−1) = 0 
⇔𝑈𝑈′( 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡) = 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡  ∆𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 
3) 𝜕𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝜕 𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 = 0 ⇔ ?̂?𝛽𝑡𝑡 �𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡 � 11+ 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡�� + ?̂?𝛽𝑡𝑡+1𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡{−𝑈𝑈′( 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡+1) 𝑎𝑎𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡+1 ∆𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡+1(1 −  𝑎𝑎𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡+1)} 
⇔
𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡1 +  𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 = ?̂?𝛽.𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡{𝑈𝑈′( 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡+1) 𝑎𝑎𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡+1 ∆𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡+1 ∆𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡+1 𝑎𝑎𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡+1} 
⇔
𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡1 +  𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 = ?̂?𝛽.𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡{𝑈𝑈′( 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡+1) 𝑎𝑎𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡+1 ∆𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝑈𝑈′( 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡+1) 𝑎𝑎𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡+1} 
⇔
𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡1 +  𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 = ?̂?𝛽.𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡{𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡+1 ∆𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡+1} 
1st formula: 
𝑈𝑈′( 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡) ∆𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 = ?̂?𝛽. (1 +  𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡).𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡{𝑈𝑈′( 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡+1) 𝑅𝑅𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡+1} 
⇔𝑈𝑈′( 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡) = ?̂?𝛽. (1 +  𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡).𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡{𝑈𝑈′( 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡+1) 𝑅𝑅𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡+1 ∆𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡}             (43) 
2nd formula: 
𝑈𝑈′( 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡) ∆𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡(1 +  𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡) = ?̂?𝛽.𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 � ∆𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡+1 𝑈𝑈′( 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡+1) ∆𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡+1 � 
⇔𝑈𝑈′( 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡) = ?̂?𝛽. (1 +  𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡).𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡{ ∆𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡𝑈𝑈′( 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡+1)}             (44) 
 
Note: It is supposed that all the economic agents have a utility logarithmic function in the form 
𝑈𝑈(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑥𝑥)             (45) 
Thus : 
𝑈𝑈′(𝑥𝑥) = 1
𝑥𝑥
             (46) 
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II. Distributions of the estimated parameters 
 
Figure 6: Distributions of the parameters of DSGE model with financial frictions 
𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸_𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 : Standard deviations of the various shocks εA,t,εg,t,εM,t,εf,t,εδ,t and εγ,t. 
beta=𝛽𝛽, alpha=𝛼𝛼, lamda=𝜆𝜆 
 
 
Figure 7: Distributions of the parameters of DSGE model with financial frictions 
𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑟𝑟_𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑=𝛥𝛥𝛿𝛿,𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑟𝑟_𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 =𝛥𝛥𝛾𝛾, 𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑟𝑟_𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 =𝛥𝛥𝑓𝑓 
Rho_a=𝜌𝜌𝐴𝐴, Rho_c=𝜌𝜌𝑑𝑑, Rho_d=𝜌𝜌𝑐𝑐, Rho_bc=𝜌𝜌𝑀𝑀, Rho_f=𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙 
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III. Cross correlation between the variables of interest of DSGE model with financial frictions 
 
Table 8: Cross correlation between the variables of interest of DSGE model with financial frictions 
 
 
 
  
Variables p c r_d v_d w d_m pr_c pr_d l r_f d_f v_f v_i r_i d_i M g A phi_cb phi_f phi_d phi_c y
p 1 -0.91 0.39 0.58 0.88 0.9 -0.71 0.6 0.83 0.86 0.97 0.37 -0.1 0.88 0.92 0.06 0.3 -0.9 0.06 -0.12 -0.21 -0.03 -0.95
c -0.91 1 -0.64 -0.55 -0.61 -0.69 0.71 -0.37 -0.97 -0.92 -0.82 -0.11 -0.19 -0.91 -0.71 0 -0.11 0.98 0 0.1 0.19 0.01 0.9
r_d 0.39 -0.64 1 0 0.01 -0.02 -0.23 0.15 0.6 0.73 0.22 -0.18 0.74 0.66 0.02 -0.27 0.33 -0.52 -0.27 -0.06 -0.19 0.06 -0.29
v_d 0.58 -0.55 0 1 0.5 0.56 -0.49 0.27 0.55 0.45 0.58 0.22 -0.16 0.46 0.61 -0.07 0.06 -0.57 -0.07 -0.2 0.24 0.18 -0.54
w 0.88 -0.61 0.01 0.5 1 0.94 -0.55 0.7 0.51 0.58 0.94 0.55 -0.4 0.62 0.95 0.17 0.42 -0.62 0.17 -0.12 -0.18 -0.03 -0.8
d_m 0.9 -0.69 -0.02 0.56 0.94 1 -0.7 0.59 0.6 0.62 0.93 0.49 -0.47 0.67 1 0.06 0.15 -0.71 0.06 -0.09 -0.22 -0.09 -0.91
pr_c -0.71 0.71 -0.23 -0.49 -0.55 -0.7 1 -0.28 -0.64 -0.68 -0.62 -0.48 0.34 -0.76 -0.71 0.11 0.01 0.69 0.11 0.13 0.12 -0.26 0.74
pr_d 0.6 -0.37 0.15 0.27 0.7 0.59 -0.28 1 0.23 0.49 0.6 0.43 -0.19 0.48 0.61 -0.1 0.59 -0.31 -0.1 -0.08 -0.64 -0.04 -0.46
l 0.83 -0.97 0.6 0.55 0.51 0.6 -0.64 0.23 1 0.8 0.77 -0.02 0.27 0.79 0.62 0.15 -0.05 -0.99 0.15 -0.13 -0.14 0.05 -0.85
r_f 0.86 -0.92 0.73 0.45 0.58 0.62 -0.68 0.49 0.8 1 0.72 0.26 0.18 0.98 0.65 -0.27 0.38 -0.83 -0.27 -0.09 -0.21 -0.06 -0.79
d_f 0.97 -0.82 0.22 0.58 0.94 0.93 -0.62 0.6 0.77 0.72 1 0.32 -0.17 0.74 0.94 0.18 0.25 -0.85 0.18 -0.11 -0.21 -0.01 -0.93
v_f 0.37 -0.11 -0.18 0.22 0.55 0.49 -0.48 0.43 -0.02 0.26 0.32 1 -0.7 0.39 0.5 -0.02 0.48 -0.06 -0.02 -0.1 0.05 -0.04 -0.23
v_i -0.1 -0.19 0.74 -0.16 -0.4 -0.47 0.34 -0.19 0.27 0.18 -0.17 -0.7 1 0.04 -0.44 -0.16 0.03 -0.14 -0.16 -0.01 -0.07 0.18 0.16
r_i 0.88 -0.91 0.66 0.46 0.62 0.67 -0.76 0.48 0.79 0.98 0.74 0.39 0.04 1 0.7 -0.21 0.36 -0.83 -0.21 -0.12 -0.19 -0.08 -0.81
d_i 0.92 -0.71 0.02 0.61 0.95 1 -0.71 0.61 0.62 0.65 0.94 0.5 -0.44 0.7 1 0.04 0.2 -0.73 0.04 -0.1 -0.19 -0.07 -0.91
M 0.06 0 -0.27 -0.07 0.17 0.06 0.11 -0.1 0.15 -0.27 0.18 -0.02 -0.16 -0.21 0.04 1 -0.14 -0.13 1 0.05 0.1 -0.02 -0.08
g 0.3 -0.11 0.33 0.06 0.42 0.15 0.01 0.59 -0.05 0.38 0.25 0.48 0.03 0.36 0.2 -0.14 1 0.03 -0.14 -0.08 0.03 0.04 -0.02
A -0.9 0.98 -0.52 -0.57 -0.62 -0.71 0.69 -0.31 -0.99 -0.83 -0.85 -0.06 -0.14 -0.83 -0.73 -0.13 0.03 1 -0.13 0.09 0.18 0 0.92
phi_cb 0.06 0 -0.27 -0.07 0.17 0.06 0.11 -0.1 0.15 -0.27 0.18 -0.02 -0.16 -0.21 0.04 1 -0.14 -0.13 1 0.05 0.1 -0.02 -0.08
phi_f -0.12 0.1 -0.06 -0.2 -0.12 -0.09 0.13 -0.08 -0.13 -0.09 -0.11 -0.1 -0.01 -0.12 -0.1 0.05 -0.08 0.09 0.05 1 -0.06 -0.18 -0.01
phi_d -0.21 0.19 -0.19 0.24 -0.18 -0.22 0.12 -0.64 -0.14 -0.21 -0.21 0.05 -0.07 -0.19 -0.19 0.1 0.03 0.18 0.1 -0.06 1 0.14 0.27
phi_c -0.03 0.01 0.06 0.18 -0.03 -0.09 -0.26 -0.04 0.05 -0.06 -0.01 -0.04 0.18 -0.08 -0.07 -0.02 0.04 0 -0.02 -0.18 0.14 1 0.12
y -0.95 0.9 -0.29 -0.54 -0.8 -0.91 0.74 -0.46 -0.85 -0.79 -0.93 -0.23 0.16 -0.81 -0.91 -0.08 -0.02 0.92 -0.08 -0.01 0.27 0.12 1
